2018年10月4日,美國交通運輸部發(fā)布了備受期待的《自動駕駛汽車3.0:準(zhǔn)備迎接未來交通》,也就是業(yè)內(nèi)為人所熟知的AV 3.0指南。
該指南在美國交通運輸部 2017 年出臺的《自動駕駛系統(tǒng)2.0:安全愿景》(AutomatedDriving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety)基礎(chǔ)上,納入自動駕駛行業(yè)的各方意見,包括汽車制造商、供應(yīng)商、各州和地方政府以及基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施所有者和運營商等。
這些指南產(chǎn)生了一個概念上的矛盾,因為它們既提醒各州了解各自的權(quán)力有限,卻又對汽車制造商和供應(yīng)商不加約束。
看起來,AV3.0 指南具備一定限制含義,但又同時留有余地。對于美國交通運輸部新發(fā)布的這一指南,汽車行業(yè)將如何應(yīng)對?
不是強制規(guī)則,而是指導(dǎo)方針
與聯(lián)邦機動車輛安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(FMVSS)不同,AV3.0指南本身的性質(zhì)為指南,而非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)或規(guī)定。迄今為止,美國國家公路交通安全管理局(NHTSA)發(fā)布的所有自動駕駛汽車相關(guān)指南都不具備強制性,旨在鼓勵各州和地方政府及私營企業(yè)自愿采用這套規(guī)則,促進自主技術(shù)的健康發(fā)展。
NHTSA(隸屬于美國交通部)、FMVSS 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及其他相關(guān)汽車監(jiān)管框架的起源均可追溯至 1966 年“國家交通和機動車輛安全法案”(theNational Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966)。制定之初,這套安全法案的目標(biāo)是通過對安全要素的監(jiān)管,“減少交通事故數(shù)量”。當(dāng)時,這種“由NHTSA創(chuàng)建安全汽車框架”的規(guī)定制定策略甚至被譽為“現(xiàn)代政府最偉大的發(fā)明”。當(dāng)時,制定汽車行業(yè)規(guī)定主要有三個關(guān)鍵目標(biāo):(1)驅(qū)使行業(yè)保持創(chuàng)新;(2)確保駕駛員和乘客的基本駕乘安全;(3)將安全的重要性置于成本之上。
當(dāng)時,除了頒布行業(yè)規(guī)定之外,NHTSA還被賦予了“監(jiān)督車輛召回”的合法權(quán)利。
自此之后,NHTSA立即開始工作,并陸續(xù)發(fā)布了很多我們今天所熟知的安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。然而,在1974年到1986年的十多年中,NHTSA并未發(fā)布任何重大FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。事實上,NHTSA在最初推行新規(guī)時受到了行業(yè)各方的大力反抗,新規(guī)也受到了“不合理、不實際、不客觀及未以安全為導(dǎo)向”等一系列指責(zé)。
從結(jié)果來看,第一回合的“勝利者”是企業(yè)。在成立的最初10 年中,NHTSA共制定了 10 項主要規(guī)定,但6 項均以失敗告終,其中包括有關(guān)“被動約束系統(tǒng)”和“防抱死制動系統(tǒng)”的規(guī)定。與此同時,NHTSA在監(jiān)管車輛召回方面,反而取得了更為有利的“戰(zhàn)果”。
在出臺主要規(guī)定接連失利之后,NHTSA再未開展重大行動,直到美國國會提出強制要求。1991年,美國國會通過了ISTEA法案,要求有關(guān)車輛防側(cè)翻、側(cè)面碰撞保護、助推器座椅設(shè)計改進及一系列相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)就位。2000年,比爾·克林頓總統(tǒng)簽署了《有關(guān)加強運輸車輛召回、問責(zé)和文件記錄法案”》(Transportation Recall Enhancement,Accountability, and Documentation Act,即TREAD法案),主要關(guān)注輪胎問題。歷史經(jīng)驗表明,如果國會不出手,NHTSA可能更傾向于對FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及相關(guān)規(guī)定保持沉默。事實上,從某種程度而言,AV 1.0、AV2.0及AV 3.0的情況都是如此。
不過,AV3.0指南的情況略有不同,最起碼表明了NHTSA多年以后重新進入規(guī)則制定領(lǐng)域的意向。
NHTSA 是否會試圖消除“額外監(jiān)管障礙?”
最新AV 3.0 指南已經(jīng)認識到,現(xiàn)行的FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可能成為阻礙創(chuàng)新的障礙。
專為SAE4級和5級自動駕駛設(shè)計的自動駕駛汽車,可能不會配備方向盤、剎車、油門、后視鏡等零部件,而這明顯不符合現(xiàn)行FMVSS 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對道路車輛的要求。在未來制定新規(guī)的過程中,NHTSA開始就“修改相關(guān)安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”征求意見。2015年11月12日,谷歌曾致函要求對FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中有關(guān)“車輛必須配備駕駛員”的規(guī)定進行解釋,并表示“配備自動駕駛系統(tǒng)”的無人駕駛汽車也應(yīng)被視為“已配備駕駛員”。根據(jù)當(dāng)時的回復(fù),我們不難推斷,NHTSA未來將重新審閱大量FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。
除了新規(guī)制定流程,NHTSA還希望通過一系列努力讓FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)更加靈活、響應(yīng)迅速、以性能為導(dǎo)向,但同時不區(qū)分具體技術(shù)。AV 3.0指南表明,未來的交通環(huán)境中可能充滿各種不可預(yù)測的障礙物、車輛和行人,在此環(huán)境下,新時代的FMVSS在“驗證自動駕駛系統(tǒng)時可能采用一套更簡單和更通用的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。
無論如何,這些建議都預(yù)示著一個信息:未來,NTHSA將不再繼續(xù)沉默。
如何防止各州安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的“東拼西湊”?
值得一提的是,AV3.0指南再次強調(diào)了FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的優(yōu)先權(quán)。簡單來說,當(dāng)聯(lián)邦法律“壓制”或優(yōu)先于與其不一致的州法律時,就以聯(lián)邦法律為優(yōu)先。2000年,美國最高法院曾在一起訴訟中分析了這一問題:該訴訟稱一款1987款本田的被動約束系統(tǒng)未配備安全氣囊,因此應(yīng)視為設(shè)計缺陷;而當(dāng)時的FMVSS標(biāo)準(zhǔn)允許制造商在設(shè)計被動約束系統(tǒng)時三選其一,其中包括安全氣囊。在此案例及隨后的幾個相似案例中,法院均裁決州、地方和部落政府不能通過立法對車輛的安全性能做出與聯(lián)邦標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不同的要求。
事實上,在所有有關(guān)自動駕駛汽車的指南方針中,NHTSA早已明確表示其負責(zé)制定安全和性能相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn),而各州繼續(xù)負責(zé)其它四個關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域:保險、執(zhí)照、交通安全法和責(zé)任(包括產(chǎn)品責(zé)任)。
未來路在何方?
AV 3.0指南中唯一可以確定的部分是:自動駕駛車輛開發(fā)和部署制度仍處于自愿遵守階段。從AV 3.0指南附錄中紀(jì)錄的大量研究中,我們可以清楚看到,NHTSA將繼續(xù)高度依賴SAE等標(biāo)準(zhǔn)組織所做的工作,并同時回饋給他們可以激發(fā)行業(yè)創(chuàng)新的規(guī)定。我們相信,正如TREAD法案曾推動解決輪胎相關(guān)缺陷問題一樣,立法也將加快NHTSA推行自動駕駛汽車規(guī)定。
然而,如果目前仍在分裂之中的國會未能及時采取行動,NHTSA可能將不得不繼續(xù)在新規(guī)制定過程中不斷試探。不過,曾經(jīng)的問題仍然存在:汽車行業(yè)是否會支持NHTSA的努力?是否又會像1968年至1974年間那樣,瘋狂質(zhì)疑任何新起草規(guī)則的權(quán)威和適用范圍。這次,考慮到不確定性的存在和豁免權(quán)的限制,行業(yè)可能會做出不同選擇!
On October 4, 2018, the U.S. Department of Transportation released the long-awaited “Autonomous Vehicles 3.0: Preparing for the Future of Transportation” guidelines—otherwise known as AV 3.0.
These guidelines build upon the voluntary guidance issued in the DOT’s 2017 “Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety” and incorporate comments from autonomy stakeholders that include auto manufacturers, suppliers, state and local governments and infrastructure owners and operators.
These federal guidelines create a conceptual challenge, as they remind states of the limits of their power while being—controversially—non-binding on automotive manufacturers and suppliers.
Potentially restrictive, yet simultaneously optional. How can the industry navigate this recent DOT release?
It’s not a rule; it’s a guideline
Unlike the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), the AV 3.0 guidelines are just that: guidelines. All of the AV-related guidelines issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to date are voluntary and serve to encourage state governments, local governments and private industry to adopt the principles to promote the development of autonomous technology.
The origins of NHTSA (part of the DOT), the FMVSS and the related automotive regulatory framework are found in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. The goal of the Safety Act was to “reduce traffic accidents” through the regulation of safety elements. This rulemaking strategy, where NHTSA would create the framework for safer vehicles, was even hailed as one of the “greatest inventions of modern government.” This approach to auto-industry regulation would lead to three key objectives: (1) compel the industry to strive for innovation; (2) ensure that drivers and passengers would be reasonably safe in their vehicles and (3) elevate safety above cost.
Along with this rulemaking authority, NHTSA was granted the legal rights to oversee recalls.
The agency immediately went to work and issued many of the safety standards we have come to know today. Yet in the decade-plus from 1974 to 1986, there were no major FMVSS issued. After the initial push, companies pushed back, claiming that many of the agency’s rules were not reasonable, practical, objective, or safety-oriented.
Industry won the first battles. During the first 10 years of its existence, NHTSA lost six of its ten major rulemaking cases including cases addressing passive restraints and antilock brakes. At the same time, NHTSA received far more favorable outcomes from cases addressing its recall-enforcement mandate.
Following these significant rulemaking losses, NHTSA acted in only minor ways until compelled by Congress. In 1991, Congress passed ISTEA, a bill requiring rulemaking address rollover prevention, side impact protection, booster-seat design improvements and related standards. In 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD) which focused predominantly on tire issues. Absent Congressional action, history suggests that NHTSA will tend to remain silent on FMVSS and related regulation. This was true of AV 1.0 and AV 2.0 and, to a degree, AV 3.0.
The only difference is that AV 3.0 suggests NHTSA has its eye on reentering the rule making arena after these many years.
Will NHTSA seek to remove an “unintended regulatory barrier?”
The new AV 3.0 guidelines recognize that the current FMVSS may be a barrier to innovation.
Autonomous vehicles designed for SAE Level 4 and 5 performance may not be equipped with steering wheels, control pedals, mirrors or other components that are currently required for on-road vehicles. The NHTSA will, in an upcoming rule making, seek comment on changes to relevant safety standards; judging by the agency’s response to Google’s November 12, 2015 letter requesting interpretation of the FMVSS as applied it a driverless vehicle operated by a “Self- Driving System,” it is likely a review of any number of existing FMVSS.
In addition to new rule making, NHTSA will make FMVSS more flexible, responsive, technology-neutral and performance-oriented. AV 3.0 suggests that new-age FMVSS may “incorporate simpler and more general requirements to validate” autonomous systems in a world where unpredictable obstacles, vehicles and pedestrians dot the landscape.
These recommendations foreshadow a departure from the recent historical silence that has fallen over NTHSA rule making.
How to prevent a patchwork of state safety standards?
The guidelines continue to address the preemptive force of the FMVSS. Federal preemption occurs when a federal law “trumps” or preempts a state law that is inconsistent with the federal law. In 2000, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the issue of preemption in a lawsuit that asserted that a 1987 Honda had a design defect because it did not have airbags at a time when the FMVSS allowed manufacturers to choose one of three options (including airbags) to address passive restraints. Through this case and several that followed, courts determined that state, local and tribal governments cannot enforce laws on the safety performance of a vehicle in ways that differ from federal standards.
In all of the guidance issued on autonomous vehicles, NHTSA has been clear that it holds responsibility for establishing safety and performance-related standards, while the states retain four key areas: insurance, licensure, traffic safety laws, and liability (including product liability).
What will the future hold?
The only certainty given in AV 3.0 is that the regime for autonomous-vehicle development and deployment is still in the voluntary-compliance phase. It is clear from the significant research placed in AV 3.0’s appendices that NHTSA will continue to rely heavily on the work performed by standards organizations such as SAE International while they hope to return to the rule making function that inspired their creation. Perhaps legislation will speed that effort, just as the TREAD Act did for tire-related defects.
But in the event the current divided Congress fails to act, it is plausible that NHTSA will once again test the rule making waters. The only question that will remain is whether the industry will support those efforts or, as it did from 1968-1974, challenge the authority and the scope of any newly drafted rules. Perhaps with the existing uncertainty and limits in exemptions, the choice may be different this time.
Author: Jennifer Dukarski
Source: SAE Autonomous Vehicle Engineering